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I. Introduction

Ensuring Durable Environmental
Benefits Through a Collaborative
Approach to Hydropower
Re-licensing: Case Studies

By Avinash Kar*

The last century has seen the rise of
environmental awareness from its nascent
conservation-oriented beginnings to the
multi-faceted, complex, ecological systemsbased perspective that informs environmental activism today. We realize today the potential for environmental impacts in almost
any human activity and that we must strive
continually to balance the risks and benefits
to ensure that our needs and wants are met
while still protecting the environment upon
which we depend. We continually become
more aware of the ecological impacts of
even the most well-meaning of human activities. Wind-farms which produce clean,
renewable energy may harm endangered
birds that fly into wind-turbine blades. Or
emission- and smog-reducing gasoline
additives may leach into groundwater, contaminating drinking sources. So it is with
hydropower, the generation of electricity by
damming rivers and waterways.
As the discussion below will show, hydropower facilities mushroomed in the
middle of the 20th century, subject to remarkably little environmental oversight, a
product of a less-environmentally aware
time. Today, of course, we are aware not
only of the benefits of hydropower, but also
of its damaging impact on the environment
if not properly managed. Many of the facilities granted federal licenses forty or fifty
years ago have only now begun to come up
*

J.D. candidate, U.C. Hastings College of the
Law, 2005. The note is based in part on a project
the author worked on with Kevin Mora while
both were legal interns at the Natural Resources
Defense Council during the summer of 2003. The
author would also like to thank Ralph Cavanagh
for his gracious advice and thoughtful comments
throughout the process, and Meghan Byrne for
her rigorous and insightful edits.
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for license renewals in the past decade or
so, finally providing an opportunity to incorporate environmental requirements into
the permits. It is in this context that one of
the more promising opportunities to develop long-term, environmentally sensitive
planning in this arena presents itself.
As of 1996, there were approximately
2,358 hydroelectric plants operating in the
United States.1 Overall, hydroelectric projects
provide 74,800 megawatts of generating capacity,2 and a little over 7% of the electricity
generated in the US.3 Hydropower offers
environmental and economic benefits, but
also inflicts serious environmental damage.4
Hydropower projects represent 96% of renewable energy production in the US, the equivalent of 531 million barrels of oil each year,
while creating no air pollution.5 These
projects provide electricity at a relatively low
fiscal cost and, if a project has substantial
water storage capacity, it can provide power
“almost instantaneously at times of peak energy demand, helping prevent brownouts and
power outages.”6
On the other hand, hydropower projects
1. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Water Power:
Present Development of Conventional Hydroelectric Projects, at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/
water-power/wp-present-dev.asp (last updated June
13, 2003) [hereinafter Water Power Present Development].
2. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Water
Power: Use and Regulation of a Renewable Resource, at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/geninfo/water-power/wp-use.asp (last updated June
13, 2003) [hereinafter Water Power Use].
3. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SEPTEMBER
2004 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW, at Table 7.2a, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/elect.html (last
modified Sept. 28, 2004). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) web site indicates that
hydroelectricity represents “about 10 percent” of electricity produced in the US. Water Power Use, supra
note 2. In addition to conventional hydroelectric
power, pumped storage hydroelectric projects store
water during times of low demand for generating
electricity at times of peak demand. Fed. Energy Regu28
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have significant environmental effects. It goes
almost without saying that dam and facilities
construction and the various alterations in the
natural patterns of rivers compromise aesthetic values.7 Hydropower facilities threaten
the existence of species such as salmon and
sturgeon: dams create barriers to fish migration; the obstructions cause siltation upstream, destroying habitat and killing fish; hydropower turbines draw in and kill fish; and
reduced downstream flows lead to higher temperatures and lower oxygen levels, creating
conditions inhospitable for some fish.8 Lower
water levels also threaten water quality (by reducing dilution capacity) and make it more
expensive to treat wastewater discharges.9 In
addition, hydropower operations cause severe
fluctuations in water levels as they withhold
and then release water to generate power
during peak periods, disrupting riparian ecosystems and the lifecycles of other wildlife inhabiting the area.10 Hydropower dams can
also dry up or lower water levels in stretches
of river so that downstream recreation is disrupted.11 Thus, while hydropower offers some
important benefits, it also inflicts serious environmental costs that need to be addressed.
latory Comm’n, Water Power: Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Projects, at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/water-power/wp-pump.asp (last updated June 13, 2003). Pumped storage projects provide an additional 8,400 megawatts of generating
capacity. Water Power Present Development, supra note 1.
4. See Kurt Stephenson, Taking Nature into Account: Observations about the Changing Role of Analysis
and Negotiation in Hydropower Re-licensing, 25 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 473, 474-77 (2000).
5. Water Power Use, supra note 2.
6. Stephenson, supra note 4, at 474-75.
7. See Sarah C. Richardson, The Changing Political Landscape of Hydropower Project Relicensing, 25
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 499, 508 (2000).
8. Id.; Stephenson, supra note 4, at 475.
9. Stephenson, supra note 4, at 475.
10. Id.; Richardson, supra note 7, at 508.
11. Stephenson, supra note 4, at 475-76.

The critical question, then, is how to
decide between the “competing ends, interests, and values”12 at stake in hydropower
licensing decisions. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), the federal
agency responsible for licensing hydropower
facilities, has approached the question in
three different ways: (1) the traditional agency
comment-based adversarial process (Traditional Licensing Process); (2) an alternative
collaborative process (Alternative Licensing
Process); and (3) a process that integrates
the other two approaches and goes into full
effect in July 2005 (Integrated Licensing Process). 13 Both the traditional and collaborative approaches have their pros and cons.14
But the collaborative approach embodied in
the Alternative and Integrated processes is
an increasingly favored route to addressing
the environmental concerns involved in the
licensing of hydropower facilities.15
Hundreds of hydropower licenses will
come up for re-licensing or renewal in the
next few years.16 With that in mind, this note
analyzes the development of the collaborative approach to licensing. To set the context, section II considers the stakes involved
in re-licensing. Section III examines the
particulars of the various re-licensing procedures and the trend towards a more col-

12. Id. at 477.
13. Id. at 484-88, 492-97; Fed. Energy Regula-

tory Comm’n, Hydroelectric Licensing Rulemaking, Order
2002, at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/indus-act/hl-over.asp (last updated Aug. 16,
2004) [hereinafter Hydroelectric Rulemaking Order].
14. See Stephenson, supra note 4, at 478-484.
15. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA HYDROPOWER REFORM COALITION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COOPERATIVE RELICENSING
PROCEEDINGS 1, available at http://www.calhrc.org/
relicensing/toolkit.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
16. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Hydropower Projects Under Commission License, at http://
www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info.asp
(scroll down to “List of Projects.”) (web-page last

A Collaborative Approach to Hydropower Re-licensing

laborative model. And section IV looks at
two case studies to assess the collaborative approach from an environmental perspective and to identify some of the practices being used in collaborative settlement
agreements to implement robust and durable responses to environmental concerns.
II. The Re-licensing Stakes
FERC regulates the non-federal hydroelectric power projects that affect navigable
waterways, are located on federal lands, use
water or water-power at federal government
dams, or otherwise affect interstate commerce. 17 FERC oversees hydropower
project licenses as part of its duties,18 and
FERC-regulated facilities represent 56% of
hydropower facilities in the US.19 There are
currently more than 1,000 licensed facilities in the US,20 with licenses lasting from
thirty to fifty years.21 The majority of these
FERC-regulated facilities are located in the
western US, especially in Washington, Oregon, and California.22 In California alone,
thirty-five hydropower project licenses are
scheduled to expire between 2005 and
2025, representing almost a third of the licensed projects located in the state.23 One
hundred and sixty licenses affecting 262
dams on 105 rivers expired nationwide in

updated Oct. 12, 2004; chart last updated Feb.
11, 2004) [hereinafter Hydropower Projects List].
17. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Origin of
Hydroelectric Regulation, at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/origin.asp (last updated
June 13, 2003) [hereinafter Regulatory Origins].
18. Id.
19. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Water Power: Regulation of this Renewable Resource, at http:/
/www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/water-power/wp-reg.asp (last updated June 13, 2003).
20. Water Power Present Development, supra note 1.
21. Regulatory Origins, supra note 17.
22. See Hydropower Projects List, supra note 16.
23. Id.
29
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1993.24 One hundred and eighteen projects
were issued licenses between 2000 and
2003, and 202 licenses are scheduled to expire nationwide between 2005 and 2020,25
with the majority of the licenses representing re-licensings.26 FERC expects about
7,420 megawatts of generating capacity
across the US to come up for re-licensing in
2007 alone.27
Hundreds of hydropower licenses were
granted during the “big dam era” of the
1930s, 40s, and 50s — before widespread
awareness of the environmental damage
that dams can cause.28 Since then, court
decisions and legislation have made consideration of environmental factors an explicit condition of granting licenses.29 The
Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986
(“ECPA”) amended the Federal Power Act
(“FPA”) to incorporate environmental considerations.30 It amended section 4(e) of
the FPA to require that FERC “give equal
consideration to the purposes of energy
conservation, the protection, mitigation of
damage to, and enhancement of, fish and
wildlife (including related spawning grounds
and habitat), the protection of recreational
opportunities, and the preservation of other
aspects of environmental quality.”31 The

24. California Hydropower Reform Coalition,
About Relicensing, at http://www.calhrc.org/
relicensing/about.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2004) [hereinafter About Relicensing].
25. See Hydropower Projects List, supra note 16.
26. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Water Power: Re-licensing or Applications for New Licenses,
at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/geninfo/water-power/wp-licensing.asp (last updated
June 13, 2003) [hereinafter Re-licensing Applications].
27. Id.
28. Richardson, supra note 7, at 500.
29. See id. at 508-10.
30. Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986
(ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
30

Volume 11, Number 1

ECPA similarly amended section 10(a) of the
FPA so that it now provides that licensed
projects must be adapted to serve a comprehensive plan “for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish
and wildlife,” and “for other beneficial public uses, including irrigation, flood control,
water supply, and recreational, and other
purposes referred to” in section 4(e).32 Finally, ECPA added section 10(j) to the FPA
to require conditions in licenses to protect
the environmental values identified above
based on recommendations by the US Fish
and Wildlife Service, the National Marine
Fisheries Service, and state fish and wildlife
agencies.33
As large numbers of hydropower facilities come up for re-licensing, the legislative amendments offer opportunities to
make environmental considerations an integral part of hydropower licenses. The
California Hydropower Reform Coalition
(“CHRC”), a coalition of environmental
groups addressing riparian issues,34 believes that the re-licensing context today
presents “a rare opportunity for Californians
to upgrade project operations and design
to reduce impacts to our rivers, and restore
fish and wildlife habitat and recreation

31. ECPA § 3(a), 100 Stat. at 1243 (amending § 4(e)
of the Federal Power Act as codified at 16 U.S.C. § 797).
32 . ECPA § 3(b), 100 Stat. at 1243-1244
(amending § 10(a) of the Federal Power Act as
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 803).
33. ECPA § 3(c), 100 Stat. at 1244 (adding § 10(j) to
the Federal Power Act as codified at 16 U.S.C. § 803).
34. California Hydropower Reform Coalition,
Coordination and Coalition Building, at http://
www.calhrc.org/coordination/index.htm#steering
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (The coalition includes
the following organizations: American Rivers,
American Whitewater, California Outdoors, California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, California
Trout, Foothill Conservancy, Friends of the River,
National Heritage Institute, and Trout Unlimited).

opportunities.”35 The same opportunity
presents itself across the western states
and the country.36
III. License Application Alternatives and
the Move Towards a Collaborative
Model
To renew its license, a licensee must file
a notice of intent indicating whether or not it
intends to renew its project license at least
five years before the license expires.37 It must
then file an application for the new license
at least two years before the license expires.38
In the past, under the Traditional Licensing Process, prior to filing an application, the applicant had to first go through a
pre-filing consultation with affected resource
agencies (federal, state, and interstate) and
tribes, and some very limited consultation
with the public, outlining the project and
the re-licensing plans, including environmental effects and planned mitigation mea35. California Hydropower Reform Coalition,
Hydropower Relicensing Projects, at http://www.calhrc.org/
relicensing/index.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
36. See Water Power Development, supra note 1 (“The
leading states in hydroelectric power generation are
Washington, California, and Oregon.”); Re-licensing
Applications, supra note 26 (“Between 1993 and 2010,
the top four states for number of licenses expiring
are Wisconsin, Michigan, Maine, and California.”).
37. Re-licensing Applications, supra note 26.
38. Id.
39. Hydropower Licensing Under the Federal
Power Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 13,988, 13,989 (proposed Feb.
20, 2003); CFR 18 PARTS 2, 4, 9, 16, 375, AND 385 (REDLINE/
STRIKE-OUT VERSION) § 16.8(b) (pre-redline), at C-59 to
C-60, and § 16.8(j) (as struck-out), at C-68 to C-69,
available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/
indus-act/hl-over.asp (last updated Aug. 16, 2004)
[hereinafter REDLINED RULE]. See also AMERICAN RIVERS &
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, RIVER RENEWAL: RESTORING RIVERS THROUGH HYDROPOWER DAM RELICENSING, at Introduction § D, available at http://www.amrivers.org/
index.php?module=HyperContent&func=display&cid=1951
(click on “Introduction” and scroll down to identified
sections on the new page) (last visited Oct. 7, 2004)
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sures.39 It also had to carry out necessary
studies to inform the license application
process.40 Following the filing of the application, agencies and public groups could
review the application and request any additional studies they thought might be required, and the licensee had to carry out
these additional studies if FERC approved
the request.41 Following completion of the
studies, the application was deemed ready
for review and interested parties could submit any additional comments regarding
terms and conditions of the license or other
matters.42 The environmental review was
usually initiated at this time, consisting of
an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”)
or Environmental Assessment (“EA”) required by the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”), followed by another round of
comments on the document, by hearings
on any remaining questions and, finally, the
FERC decision on the license renewal.43 As
[hereinafter RIVER RENEWAL]. The River Renewal report
states that “[t]he licensee must then consult with state
and federal resource agencies (e.g., Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Park Service, state fish and game
departments) regarding the operations needed to protect fish and wildlife and provide recreation enhancements.” There is no mention of public involvement.
40. Hydropower Relicensing Under the Federal Power Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 13,989; RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § D.
41. Id.
42. Id. The terms and conditions required by the
federal agency administering the United States lands
on which the project is located (in most cases the Department of Agriculture or Interior) were, and continue
to be, mandatory and must be included in the license
by FERC pursuant to section 4(e) of the FPA. 16 U.S.C.
§ 797(e) (2000); Hydropower Relicensing Under the Federal Power Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 13,989. Furthermore,
the conditions recommended by resource agencies
pursuant to section 10(j) of the FPA, are owed deference by FERC and cannot be disregarded without
adequate explanation. 16 U.S.C § 803(j)(2).
43. Hydropower Relicensing Under the Federal Power Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 13,989; RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § D.
31
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the process suggests, the Traditional Licensing Process followed a notice and comment
hearing procedure and allowed little opportunity for public involvement until after the
application was filed.44
FERC has also developed an Alternative Licensing Process which, by contrast,
employs a collaborative approach aimed at
crafting a settlement agreement among all
the stakeholders, which allows for public
participation from the very beginning of the
process. One of the goals of the Alternative
process is to “combine into a single process
the pre-filing consultation process, the environmental review process under [NEPA]
and administrative processes associated
with the Clean Water Act and other statutes.”45 The Alternative process aims to
“promote cooperative efforts,” sharing of
information, and the narrowing of areas of
disagreement to reach agreement or settlement of issues raised by the re-licensing.46
A report issued by American Rivers, a nonprofit group, and the National Park Service
explains as follows:
[S]ettlements can occur at any
time in the relicensing process.
However, the trend has been to
develop settlement agreements
before the environmental review
has been conducted. In this way,
FERC can evaluate the proposed
settlement terms and conditions
as possible alternatives in the EA
or EIS. Once a settlement has
been successfully negotiated and
signed, it is submitted to FERC
with the request that all settlement
terms and conditions be included
44. Id.
45. 18 C.F.R. § 4.34(i)(2)(i) (2004).
46. Id. § 4.34(i)(2)(iv).
47. RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § F.
48. See Hydroelectric Licensing Under the Federal
32
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as part of the official license. However, because FERC sometimes
omits or alters terms of the settlement agreement which are not
“conventional” FERC license provisions, many settlement parties
have included a clause in the
settlement making all settlement
terms legally binding regardless of
whether FERC includes them in
the license.47
In July 2003, FERC announced yet another approach to re-licensing called the
Integrated Licensing Process.48 Until July
2005, license applicants are able to choose
between the Traditional and Integrated processes or can request authorization to use
the Alternative process.49 Starting July 2005,
the Integrated Licensing Process will be the
default and FERC approval will be required
to use either the Traditional or Alternative
processes.50
True to its name, the new approach integrates the Traditional and Alternative processes. Under the new process, the
applicant’s pre-filing consultation and
FERC’s determination of the scope of review
required by NEPA are conducted concurrently to identify issues early in the process,
in contrast to the sequential method used
in both the Traditional and Alternative processes.51 To achieve that integration, the
process calls for the following: increased
public participation at the pre-filing consultation stage; better coordination between
FERC’s NEPA preparation and other state
and federal agencies’ processes; development of a FERC-approved study plan by the
applicant (instead of an applicant-proposed
Power Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 51,069, 51,070 (Aug. 25, 2003) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 4, 5, 9, 16, 375, and 385).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; Hydroelectric Rulemaking Order, supra note 13.

plan that is later modified through a comment process as outlined above); encouragement to engage in informal resolution
of disagreements about studies to be conducted, followed by dispute resolution if
necessary, thus limiting the need for postapplication study requests; early, increased,
and more sustained FERC involvement; and
more defined deadlines for all participants,
including FERC.52 FERC foresees a continuing and significant role for collaborative
settlement agreements in the Integrated
process. Many of the above measures are
designed to foster and encourage settlement, even going so far as to change the
proposed regulation to allow for short “timeouts” from the strict schedule of the Integrated process when a settlement agreement seems likely and the parties are in
need of further time to resolve negotiations.53 The Integrated process can be characterized as a collaborative approach with
more structure.
Even the Traditional process has been
modified during the course of the Integrated
process rulemaking in response to success
with the Alternative process. Until changes
were proposed in 2003, the Traditional process allowed for almost no public participation prior to the filing of the application, by
which time environmental studies had already
been completed. 54 Now, public participation
52. Hydroelectric Licensing Under the Federal
Power Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 51,071; Hydroelectric
Rulemaking Order, supra note 13; see also Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, Hydroelectric Licensing Rulemaking,
Order 2002 - Matrix Comparing Three Processes, at http:/
/www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/indus-act/hlmatrix.asp (last updated Oct. 16, 2003).
53. Hydroelectric Licensing Under the Federal
Power Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 51,103; 18 C.F.R. § 5.29(g).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
55. 18 C.F.R. §§ 16.8(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(5). See
Hydroelectric Licensing Under the Federal Power
Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 51,071.
56. Stephenson, supra note 4, at 489.
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in the Traditional process starts at the pre-filing consultation stage and public comments
are considered along with the comments of
resource agencies and tribes; however, the prefiling consultation and the environmental review process remain separate.55
While this updated Traditional process
does not involve settlement agreements, the
Integrated process, which will be the default
process starting in July 2005, has embraced
the idea of settlement agreements nursed
in the Alternative process. As this suggests,
the re-licensing process has increasingly
gravitated towards the collaborative approach embodied in the Integrated and Alternative processes. This trend is a response
to several factors. A Traditional re-licensing
that took nine months to process before the
ECPA was passed in 1986, took three years
to process in 1987 and required more than
four years by the period between 1994 and
1996.56 As the American Rivers/National
Park Service report points out, Alternative
process re-licensings have “have generally
yielded faster and more creative improvements for rivers than those achieved in traditional relicensings.”57 The final rule instituting the Integrated process notes that the
Alternative process has a “demonstrated
track record of reducing license application
processing times and fostering settlement
agreements.”58 While the changes to the
57. RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § F.
58. Hydroelectric Licensing Under the Federal Power

Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 51,072. It should be noted here that
the process is still expensive. At least in the case of PG&E’s
Land Conservation Commitment (discussed infra Section IV.A), the environmental improvements, with a cost
of $100 million, are funded by small increases in the bills
of electric ratepayers. See Opinion Modifying the Proposed Settlement Agreement of Pacific Gas & Electric
Company, PG&E Corporation and the Commission Staff,
and Approving the Modified Settlement Agreement, Investigation 02-04-026, at 62, 66 (California Public Utilities
Commission Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://
www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/32684.doc
(last visited Oct. 7, 2004) [hereinafter CPUC Opinion].
33
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Traditional process make that process more
efficient, the Integrated process continues to
save time by combining the pre-filing and
environmental review processes. Additionally, both processes utilizing collaborative
approaches — the Integrated and Alternative processes — still offer the full benefits of
fostering settlement negotiations. Negotiations can serve “a valuable role in utilizing
diverse and diffuse knowledge,” allowing parties to “revise and discover their preferences,
discover and create alternatives, and better
understand the outcome of alternative policies,” thus “making use of dispersed, fragmented knowledge and accommodating diverse sets of interests,” often saving time by
avoiding the formal process.59
From the environmentalist’s perspective, at the very least, the collaborative approach offers the prospect of less environmental harm through shorter delays: the
collaborative approach not only avoids procedural delays, “mitigation provided for in
settlements can often be implemented with
less delay, curtailing further resource degradation.”60 For licensees, in addition to the
potential time-saving benefits, at a minimum, the collaborative approach provides
an opportunity for good public relations.61
The early public participation that is a feature of the collaborative approach, and has
now been folded into the Traditional process, often also helps avoid expensive studies as issues are identified early.62 Given
these potential mutual benefits for environmentalists and licensees, as well as the time59. Stephenson, supra note 4, at 482-83. See
RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § F.
60. RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § F.
61. See, e.g., Fenton Roskelley, Avista Recognized for Dam Relicensing Efforts, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN
REVIEW, June 1, 2003, at H2 (“Power companies
don’t often receive kudos in fish and game agency
magazines. But Avista Corp. is lavishly praised
34

saving benefits for regulators, working on
settlement negotiations can often help establish “a framework for long-term cooperation” and reduce the adversarial tensions
that can develop under the Traditional process.63 Through FERC’s incorporation of
settlement agreements into the Integrated
process and retention of the Alternative process as an option for re-licensing, the collaborative model continues to be an integral part of the re-licensing process. The
case studies that follow are an attempt to
better understand the strengths and weaknesses of the collaborative approach from
an environmental perspective, and to identify settlement strategies that ensure effective and lasting solutions to the environmental problems faced by watershed lands.
IV. Case Studies
This note considers two examples of
collaborative agreements to protect environmental resources: Pacific Gas & Electric’s
(“PG&E”) Land Conservation Commitment
(“Conservation Commitment”) as part of its
bankruptcy proceedings and Avista
Corporation’s Clark Fork Settlement Agreement (“Clark Fork Agreement”) in the context of FERC re-licensing. PG&E’s Conservation Commitment is not made in the
FERC context. However, it has many similarities to the FERC collaborative process,
which make it a useful case study. PG&E is
also a utility with significant stakes in the
outcome of the agreement, and the agreement — like agreements in the FERC con-

in a recent issue of Montana Outdoors . . . .”);
Paul McHugh, Monumental Deal for PG&E Land:
140,000 Acres of Utility’s Upper Watershed to be Protected for Wildlife, Outdoor Enthusiasts, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 2, 2004, at A1.
62. See RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § F.
63. RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § F.

text — is aimed at ensuring environmental
protections in exchange for a facilitated process for the utility’s objectives. The Conservation Commitment also serves as a useful
model to examine the structure, effectiveness, and long-term potential of settlement
agreements aimed at protecting environmental values in the context of hydropower
utility operations. The various stages involved in finalizing the PG&E Conservation
Commitment also mirror aspects of the Traditional, Alternative, and Integrated processes in the course of the same proceeding. This provides a useful platform to study
the differences between the processes and
the advantages of each approach in ensuring protection for the environment.
A. PG&E’s Land Conservation Commitment
The PG&E Bankruptcy Settlement
Agreement between PG&E, PG&E’s parent
corporation, and the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”), included the
Conservation Commitment. This Conservation Commitment provides improved opportunities for environmental benefits and public access in 140,000 acres of PG&E watershed lands associated with its hydroelectric facilities, while maintaining PG&E’s ability to generate electricity from the facilities.64
The Conservation Commitment aims at the
preservation and environmental enhancement of these 140,000 acres, as well as the
655-acre Carizzo Plain property in San Luis
Obispo County.65 (Ninety-five thousand of
these acres are subject to FERC jurisdic-

64. CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, at 61-62.
65. Id. app. C at 16. Appendix C is the final

Approved Settlement Agreement.
66. Id.
67 . CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, at 62;
McHugh, supra note 61, at A17 (“Even before the
bankruptcy, it looked as if the rest of [PG&E’s]
land would be sold”; the article reports PG&E
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tion.66 ) PG&E had previously proposed to
auction off its watershed lands.67 The Conservation Commitment in the Settlement
Agreement “would remove forever that possibility, and replace the spectre [sic] of loss
of public control with the promise of perpetual public access.”68 Considering the
Conservation Commitment, the CPUC declared that “the people of California can look
to a partnership of the environmental community, state and local governments, and
environmental stewardship organizations to
preserve the lands and improve public access where desirable.”69
The Conservation Commitment details
were developed in three stages: (1) the proposed settlement, which included the initial Conservation Commitment; (2) the Conservation Commitment Stipulation (“Stipulation”), which was subsequently negotiated
between PG&E and various parties representing environmental interests; and (3) the
final disposition made by the CPUC.70 The
initial Conservation Commitment set up the
general framework and broad parameters,
the Stipulation interpreted the initial Conservation Commitment and filled in details,
and the CPUC decision added some final
details to form the complete Conservation
Commitment currently in effect.71 Each
stage is instructive in the process of constructing an agreement with durable environmental benefits.

spokesman John Tremayne as saying that “[t]he
next step was, we had to put [the hydropower
lands] up for auction.”).
68. CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, at 62.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 61-67.
71. Id.
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In the initial Conservation Commitment
Statement of Purpose, PG&E states that it
shall ensure that the lands “are conserved
for a broad range of beneficial public values,
including the protection of the natural habitat of fish, wildlife and plants, the preservation of open space, outdoor recreation by the
general public, sustainable forestry, agricultural uses, and historic values.”72 The initial
Conservation Commitment states that PG&E
will protect these values from uses that would
conflict with their conservation.73 To do so,
PG&E agreed to subject the watershed lands
and Carizzo Plain acreage to conservation
easements or to donate them in fee simple
to public agencies or nonprofit conservation
organizations.74 PG&E also agreed to set up
a nonprofit corporation, called the Environmental Enhancement Corporation (“Environmental Enhancement Corporation” or “Corporation”), to oversee the commitment, and
it agreed to fund the corporation with $70
million to be paid in equal installments over
ten years.75

If the initial Conservation Commitment
had remained in its original state, and had
not been supplemented by the Stipulation,
serious questions as to its durability and
environmental benefits would remain. The
shortcomings are worth examining to understand potential problems with collaborative arrangements aimed at preserving or
protecting environmental resources and to
learn how to better structure effective agreements.76 The board of the Environmental
Enhancement Corporation (“Board”) was
originally to be composed of representatives
from PG&E, the CPUC, the California Department of Fish and Game (“DFG”), the
State Water Resources Control Board
(“SWRCB”), the California Farm Bureau Federation (“CFBF”), and three members of the
public to be appointed by the CPUC.77 For
an ostensibly environmental commitment,
to have no explicit reference to substantial
environmental expertise and experience on
its board was a significant oversight. While
representatives of the SWRCB, the DFG, and
the CPUC would count environmental con-

72. CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, app. A at 38.
Appendix A of the CPUC Opinion is the Proposed
Settlement Agreement Between PG&E and CPUC
(July 25, 2003). The Proposed Settlement Agreement has its own appendices. The citation to page
38 is to the initial Conservation Commitment at
Appendix E of the Proposed Settlement Agreement.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 38, ¶ 1.
75. See id. at 23-24, ¶ 17. The Environmental
Enhancement Corporation has since been renamed the Pacific Forest and Watershed Lands
Stewardship Council. Amended and Restated
Bylaws of PG&E Environmental Enhancement
Corporation art. 1, available at http://www.pge.com/
about_us/environmental_enhancement_corp/
(last visited Nov. 22, 2004). However, this article
will continue to refer to it as the Corporation or
Environmental Corporation for ease of use.
76. See Stephenson, supra note 4, at 481 (“Advocates for the rational analytic approach fear that deci-

sions made in a political process are subject to capture by narrow interest-group politics. The political
system is subject to control and disproportionate influence by the economically powerful parties. In hydropower relicensing, this sentiment may be reflected
in a general feeling that nature cannot compete against
financially powerful hydropower interests in the political arena.”); see also Handout, Session on Hydroelectric Relicensing at the 2004 Public Interest Environmental Lawyers Conference (on file with author). The
handout warns environmental participants to “beware
the hybrid licensing approach adopted by many licensees. They decline to opt in to the alternative approach, yet still hold ‘collaborative’ meetings with
stakeholders. Frequently used as window dressing to
appear collaborative while retaining more control over
the process.” Given the different circumstances of the
PG&E Bankruptcy Settlement Agreement, the
handout’s criticisms may not apply. However, a similar agreement in the re-licensing context may give rise
to some of the handout’s concerns.
77. CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, app. A at 23-24, ¶ 17.
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cerns as part of their missions, the initial
Conservation Commitment does not require
that these representatives have environmental qualifications. Given the potential,
even the likelihood, of the involvement of
hundreds of parcels of land, covering a wide
area and reflecting diverse conditions,78 a
substantial background in preservation and
knowledge of the relevant ecological values
and challenges associated with those lands
seems essential. Under the initial Conservation Commitment plan, the government
agencies could certainly pick appointees
with environmental experience, but it does
not ensure such appointments.
Even if the government agencies chose
appointees with environmental experience,
more political considerations could intrude.
The appointees could be subjected to political pressures (e.g., from an administration favoring competing interests) and would
not necessarily represent an environmental
perspective. An organization charged with
protecting environmental values could find
itself without a single environmental advocate on its Board. Furthermore, even if the
governmental representatives from DFG and
the SWRCB were strong environmental advocates, the arrangement does little to ensure the environmental effectiveness or durability of the Conservation Commitment,
since the decision-making process for the
Board is not defined at all.79 For instance,
a simple majority vote would do little to
ensure consideration of the environmental
perspective if those espousing that perspective are outnumbered. (A combination of
PG&E, the CPUC appointees, and the CFBF
could outnumber the other members of the

78. See CALIFORNIA HYDROPOWER REFORM COALITION,
OVERVIEW OF PG&E WATERSHED LANDS 1-3, available at
http://www.calhrc.org/PG&E bankruptcy/PG&E
land descriptions.doc (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
79.See CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, app. A at 38-39.
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Board.) Finally, excluding environmental
group stakeholders from the decision-making process would almost certainly lead to
opposition and delays, and would diminish the legitimacy of the Board. Combined,
these factors would threaten the long-term
effectiveness of the Board in carrying out its
environmental mandate.
The ambiguity of some of the language
in the initial Conservation Commitment
compounded the problem: With the lack of
an unambiguous environmental advocate
on the Board, clearly defined terms designed
to ensure the achievement of the environmental objectives of the Conservation Commitment become even more crucial, but the
initial Conservation Commitment does not
contain such definitions. For instance, it
allows PG&E to sell some of the protected
land without restrictions to private entities
if the land is determined to be “without significant public interest value.”80 But what
does “significant public interest value”
mean? Who would make that determination? And what review process would be
available? Likewise, the initial Conservation
Commitment Statement of Purpose lists “a
broad range of beneficial public values,” but
the initial Conservation Commitment contains no definitions of the protected values
or of their prioritization.81 Does “outdoor
recreational use”82 mean simply hunting
and fishing? Or does it extend to the use of
snowmobiles and off-road vehicles? Does
“sustainable forestry”83 require adherence to
the requirements of a recognized sustainable forestry certification, or are the indicia
of sustainability left up to the Board? Would
protection of the beneficial values84 mean

80. Id. at 38, ¶ 1.
81. Id. at 38, Statement of Purpose.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
37

West  Northwest

Fall 2004

West  Northwest

Avinash Kar

reducing current uses, maintaining existing
uses, or allowing for the expansion of uses?
Normally, such details could be left to the
decisions of the Board. However, when the
Board’s composition does not ensure an
environmental advocate, the ambiguity of
these terms takes on great importance.
Another problem with the initial Conservation Commitment is in its delineation
of the nonprofit Corporation’s role. The
Conservation Commitment refers to a process for the development of the conservation easements and the land donation
plan.85 The process calls for the Environmental Enhancement Corporation only to
recommend to PG&E the conservation objectives, criteria and plans for the disposition
of lands, and conservation easement guidelines.86 If that process were followed, final
decisions would remain in PG&E’s hands,
where business concerns may intrude. Such
an arrangement raises questions of improper influence and consequent delays
from the debates likely to ensue and about
the robustness and durability of the environmental commitment.
The initial Conservation Commitment
does not clearly outline the corporation’s
duties in creating easements or donating
land; it only refers to developing a plan for
protection of these lands and advisory and
reporting responsibilities, without providing
any details.87 Without the advantage of the
subsequent Stipulation, it remains unclear
what other duties the Corporation would
have. What would developing a plan to protect these lands entail? And would the Corporation retain oversight of the lands once
the lands have been transferred to other
parties? It also remains unclear when the

85. Id. at 38, ¶ 2.
86.Id.
87.See id. at 38-39, ¶¶ 1-3.
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Corporation’s work would have to be completed by or what would follow if the work
was not completed within the allotted time.
Additionally, the initial Conservation
Commitment (before being supplemented
by the Stipulation) did not take sufficient
note of the effects of the Corporation’s work
on the communities in which the land is
located.88 Under that original scheme, as
property values declined as a result of restrictions on the property, or as property was
donated to tax-exempt organizations, local
governments could lose property tax revenue and, consequently, might resist the
setting aside of lands for predominantly
environmental purposes.
Many of the parties to the CPUC proceeding that considered the Proposed Settlement Agreement raised objections in their
comments.89 The presiding Administrative
Law Judge encouraged the parties to resolve
their differences through a stipulation.90 In
order to get final CPUC approval for the
Settlement Agreement, PG&E had to satisfy
the environmental constituency that was a
party to the CPUC proceeding. This led to
the Land Conservation Commitment Stipulation, the final agreement that included input from the various environmental stakeholders involved and addressed many of the
shortcomings of the original commitment.91
ii. The Land Conservation Commitment
Stipulation
The process of drafting the initial Conservation Commitment is analogous to the
Traditional FERC re-licensing process: the
agency articulates a proposed course of action on the regulated entity’s application,
which is then subsequently modified by the
agency in response to comments from in88.See id.
89.CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, at 62-63.
90.Id.
91.See id.

terested parties. The process of drafting the
Stipulation, in turn, is analogous to the collaborative re-licensing process, based on a
mutual agreement between the parties, following negotiation. The improvements that
the collaborative Stipulation made to the
initial Conservation Commitment suggest
that, in the re-licensing context, the collaborative process is more likely to lead to better environmental results than FERC’s traditional regulatory model, even though collaborative processes can sometimes lead to
poor results.92 The analysis that follows will
show that the process of drafting the Stipulation allowed the various interested parties
to reach an agreement that best meets their
needs independent of the regulatory
agency. Thus, the Stipulation experience
suggests that collaborative agreements are
likely to yield better environmental results
than the traditional model and to avoid the
cumbersome regulatory process.
The Stipulation addresses most of the
potential problems with the initial Conservation Commitment. While it does not
amend the Conservation Commitment, the
Stipulation “interprets” it,93 adding important details that ensure that the agreement
works to protect environmental values. Perhaps the most important improvement is
that the Stipulation reflects an agreement
between a wide array of public agencies,
local governments, ratepayer advocates, and
recreation and environmental organizations.
The Stipulation was signed by PG&E, the
Association of California Water Agencies,
the California Farm Bureau Federation, the
92. This may happen, for instance, if there is a
great disparity in the sophistication of the parties (see
the reference to Handout, supra note 76) or if one of
the parties has little at stake in the negotiations (e.g.,
if the hydropower operators faced no regulatory pressure). Also, see the discussion at “Update,” infra.
93. Stipulation Resolving Issues Regarding the Land
Conservation Commitment, Investigation 02-04-026, at
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California Hydropower Reform Coalition, the
Office of Ratepayer Advocates, the California Resources Agency, the State Water Resources Control Board, the Tuolumne Utility District, and the U.S. Forest Service.94
Many non-parties to the CPUC proceeding
also signed the agreement, including the
Sierra Club California, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Trust for Public Land, the Northern California Council
Federation of Fly Fishers, and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management.95 By letting the
various stakeholders negotiate for the terms
they considered most important, the Stipulation process understandably led to more
balanced results.
The Stipulation takes the important
step of ensuring that the Board of the Environmental Enhancement Corporation reflects the diversity of interests of the parties
who signed the Stipulation. The Stipulation provides that after the formation of the
Corporation, the by-laws of the Corporation
will be amended to add several additional
members to the eight members provided for
in the Settlement Agreement; one representative each from the following agencies will
be added: the California Resources Agency,
the Central Valley Regional Water Control
Board, Regional Council of Rural Counties,
the California Hydropower Reform Coalition, the Trust for Public Land, the Office of
Ratepayer Advocates, and the California
Forestry Association.96 By including the
Regional Council of Rural Counties and considering its concerns, the Stipulation heads
off future resistance that could follow from
4 (September 25, 2003, California Public Utilities Commission), available at http://www.pge.com/docs/pdfs/
about_us/environmental_enhancement_corp/land conservation stipulation.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Stipulation].
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. (list is not exhaustive).
96. Id. at 5.
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a failure to consider the economic implications of the Corporation’s work.
The Stipulation also takes several other
steps that ensure a durable and effective arrangement to protect the environmental values of the watershed lands. The Stipulation
institutes a consensus-based process for the
Board’s decisionmaking, with a non-binding
dispute resolution procedure available to
help get past any gridlock.97 It also requires
the Board to have open meetings and to provide notice to the leadership of any affected
localities or entities and to any landowners
located within one mile of the parcel to be
disposed.98 Furthermore, the Stipulation
outlines the role of the Board99 and the requirements of the Land Conservation Plan
that the Environmental Enhancement Corporation is supposed to develop — including timelines, regular reporting requirements,
and provisions for consideration of the economic impact on local governments.100 The
parties to the Stipulation also explicitly provided that the CPUC retains the authority to
review land disposition decisions under section 851 of the Public Utilities Code.101 The
Stipulation also provided that PG&E will not
oppose a proposed disposition on the basis
that it has not been adequately compensated
for the value of the parcel.102 This minimizes
the danger represented by the Board’s advisory role to PG&E, where it makes non-binding recommendations to PG&E.103 Finally,
the parties stipulated that the agreement
would be a contract enforceable in any court

97. Id. at 6.
98. Id. at 7.
99. Id. at 5, 9-10.
100. Id. at 7-11, 12.
101. Id. at 9, 14.
102. Id. at 9-10.
103. See supra text accompanying note 86.

Also, under the CPUC’s reading, the
Commitment’s allowance for the sale of land
40
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of competent jurisdiction,104 ensuring that
the balance struck would survive any exclusion of terms in the agency proceedings.
By taking all of these steps, the signatories to the Stipulation avoided what could
have been a contentious, time-intensive process of developing definitions for ambiguous
terms to protect against potentially harmful
actions to the environment. The parties
agreed that the Stipulation resolves all issues
directly related to the initial Conservation Commitment except the definition of “beneficial
public values,” which the SWRCB thought
should be modified to specify that agricultural,
sustainable forestry, and outdoor recreational
uses should not be allowed on the lands unless environmentally sensitive.105 Definitional
issues still persist in the Stipulation, but are
much less problematic because, as the CPUC
suggested in responding to the SWRCB’s recommendation, “[t]he combination of state
agency representation on the governing board
with consensus voting, as well as the
Commission’s § 851 approval process and
CEQA review, will ensure that recreational
uses that unduly harm the environment are
not permitted.”106 The presence of environmental advocates on the Board, the clear delineation of responsibilities and timelines, and
consideration of the impacts on the various
affected parties helped ensure that result. The
Conservation Commitment, after being
strengthened by the Stipulation, moved to the
next stage — the CPUC’s final determination
on the PG&E Settlement Agreement.

“without significant public interest value” would
also be subject to the section 851 authority and
would be presented to the CPUC for public notice, hearing, and approval, further minimizing
the possibility of PG&E’s business concerns overriding environmental considerations. CPUC
Opinion, supra note 58, at 65.
104. Stipulation, supra note 93, at 13.
105. Id. at 4.
106. CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, at 66.

iii. CPUC’s Final Determination
The CPUC decision added one more element to PG&E’s Land Conservation Commitment upon the request of the Greenlining
Institute (“Greenlining”). Greenlining describes itself as a “multi-ethnic public policy
and advocacy institute,” whose mission is to
“empower communities of color and other
disadvantaged groups.”107 After the Stipulation was presented to the CPUC, Greenlining
asked the CPUC to expand the Conservation
Commitment to address the needs of low-income urban PG&E ratepayers who do not live
near the Sierra Nevada foothills where the vast
majority of the protected land is located.108
The CPUC agreed to Greenlining’s request and
ordered an additional $30 million to provide
a wilderness experience for urban youth —
particularly disadvantaged urban youth — and
to acquire and maintain urban parks and recreation areas.109 The CPUC also pledged to
make it a duty for its nominees to the Board
to champion this allocation.110
The incorporation of Greenlining’s requests into the final decision can be looked
at from a couple of perspectives, each high-

107. The Greenlining Institute, Welcome to the
Greenlining Institute, at http://www.greenlining.org/
(last updated Sept. 28, 2004).
108. CPUC Opinion, supra note 58, at 66.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Comments of the Peninsula Ratepayers’
Association on Proposed Decision and Alternatives,
Investigation 02-04-026, at 7 (December 8, 2003, California Public Utilities Commission), available at http:/
/www.angene.net/rates/Pen_In_PD.pdf (last visited
Oct. 5, 2004). Peninsula Ratepayers invites people
to join “a no-dues organization that Scott Rafferty
has organized to advocate for improvements to the
PG&E settlement before the California Public Utility Commission (PUC).” Peninsula Ratepayers, Peninsula Ratepayers, at http://www.angene.net/rates/
rates.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
112.See Stephenson, supra note 4, at 480-83.
113.Id.
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lighting a potential weakness of the collaborative approach in the re-licensing context.
The first perspective focuses on the negotiation process and the relative power of the parties involved. One commenter on the CPUC’s
decision, Peninsula Ratepayers’ Association,
characterizes the negotiations about the Stipulation as having “excluded Peninsula, Aglet,
and Greenlining.”111 If the characterization is
accurate, such exclusion suggests that the
collaborative approach is only as good as the
parties to the agreement. It also suggests that
an unsupervised collaborative approach has
the potential to overlook the concerns of less
politically powerful groups, thus raising environmental justice concerns.112 From this perspective, more formal, structured environments (such as the Integrated licensing process, with increased involvement and oversight by FERC) allow more opportunities to
identify and balance such potentially overlooked concerns.113 The ability to ensure that
such concerns are not overlooked, and to balance those concerns against others, would be
one of the strengths of the new Integrated relicensing process. 114

114. The CPUC provides for the compensation of
intervenors who contribute significantly to the proceeding. See Draft Decision of ALJ Cooke, Opinion
Granting Intervenor Compensation, Investigation 0204-026 (July 23, 2004, California Public Utilities Commission), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/
COMMENT_DECISION/38325.doc (last visited Oct. 5,
2004.) However, FERC makes no such provision. See
18 C.F.R § 385.214; FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO HYDROPOWER RELICENSING, available at http:/
/www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/my-rights/citizen-guides/citzguide-hydro.pdf (last updated June 8, 2004). The absence of such compensation and the higher transaction costs often associated with formal procedures
(need for lawyers, for instance) may mean that the
more formal aspects of the Integrated Process may in
fact pose a greater barrier to marginalized groups than
the collaborative process. Conversation with Ralph
Cavanagh, Senior Attorney, NRDC. Conversations with
Mr. Cavanagh were also instrumental in alerting the
author to Greenlining’s influence.
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Greenlining’s involvement could be
viewed from another perspective.
Greenlining is not an unsophisticated player
in the political landscape. For instance, in
2000, Greenlining announced a three-year,
$159-million initiative in partnership with
Merrill Lynch, one of the world’s leading financial service firms.115 More recently, its
representatives met not only with 15 financial institutions on the subject of adjustable
rate mortgages, but also with various banking regulators, including Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, himself.116 This
suggests that Greenlining may not have been
excluded from the PG&E negotiations and
may, in fact, have chosen to pursue its goals
outside the negotiations process. If this
characterization is correct, it suggests another potential weakness of the collaborative approach in the re-licensing context: the
possibility that agreements reached by detailed and time-consuming negotiations
could be altered by parties that choose not
to participate in the negotiations but, instead, wait and then bring their concerns
directly to the regulatory table. In some circumstances, such alterations to completed
negotiations may undermine the value of
collaborative endeavors. Greater FERC involvement through the Integrated process,
prodding parties during the negotiations
process, could help to avoid situations
where completed negotiations are jeopar-

dized. However, it does not eliminate opportunities for circumvention of collaborative efforts and could potentially create
more opportunities for such circumvention.

115. Press Release, Merrill Lynch, Merrill
Lynch, Greenlining Institute Announce New $159
Million Economic Partnership for Southern California, San Francisco Bay Area, (May 11, 2000),
available at http://www.ml.com/about/press_release/
20000510.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
116. Robert L. Gnaizda & John Bryant, How Big
Players Can Protect Public in Coming ARMs Race, AMERICAN BANKER (July 30, 2004), Viewpoints, Vol. 169,
No. 146. (ARMs are adjustable rate mortgages.).
117. See Press Release, Trout Unlimited, American Whitewater, Pacific Gas & Electric Co., CSERC &
Friends of the River, Public Collaborative Group Suc-

cessfully Completes 4 Year Effort to Protect and Restore Stanislaus River, (Mar. 1, 2004), available at http:/
/www.calhrc.org/conferences, articles and reports/Stan
Press Release 3.2.04.doc (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
118. Avista Corp., 90 FERC ¶ 61,167, at 61,508
(2000) (order issuing new license). A differentlypaginated version of the order is available at http:/
/elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercadvsearch.asp
(via search function, enter citation at Numbers:
FERC Cite) (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
119. See id.
120. See id. at 61,509.
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That said, however, these potential
weaknesses do not seem to have undermined the value of the PG&E negotiations;
the exercise in collaborative problem-solving already appears to have been successful in facilitating further collaboration. Several of the parties involved in the Land Conservation Commitment Stipulation recently
concluded another agreement, this time in
the re-licensing context, to protect and restore the Stanislaus River.117
B. Avista Corporation’s Clark Fork
Settlement Agreement
Avista took advantage of the collaborative Alternative Licensing Process for two
hydroelectric projects on the Clark Fork River
covering territory in Idaho and Montana.118
Though Avista’s project does not cover as
much land area as the PG&E Agreement, it
still affects a significant area of land, as the
two projects combined cover 1,269 acres of
federal land alone.119 The reservoirs at the
two dams cover 11,140 acres together and
the dams represent 697 megawatts of operating capacity, which is almost 1% of hydropower capacity in the US.120 The reservoirs
have a storage capacity of 505,000 acre-

feet.121 Moreover, like other dams, the Clark
Fork dams have significant downstream effects and any mitigation measures negotiated pursuant to the FPA could thus have
wide-ranging consequences. Therefore, the
Clark Fork Agreement serves as another
valuable case study for the application of
the collaborative process.
The Clark Fork Agreement exemplifies
the advantages of the collaborative approach,
reaching results similar to the PG&E Agreement but without the time, resources, and
effort spent developing an original agreement
which is then subsequently debated, added
to, and modified within the formal confines
of a proceeding. Moreover, the Clark Fork
Agreement has been in place since 1999,122
and its results can be examined as a useful
indicator of the longevity and effectiveness
of a collaborative agreement.
Many of the elements of the PG&E
Stipulation are also present in the Clark Fork
Agreement. Like the PG&E Stipulation, the
Clark Fork Agreement was the result of negotiations representing a diversity of interests; twenty-seven different parties signed the
agreement, including Indian tribes, sport fishermen, federal agencies, various environmental agencies from Idaho and Montana, local
governments, and several environmental
groups.123 Also, like the PG&E Stipulation,
the Clark Fork Agreement established a Management Committee reflecting those diverse
interests — in this case by simply agreeing
to have one representative from each signing party compose the Committee.124 In doing so, the Clark Fork Agreement guaranteed
environmental perspectives and advocates
121. See id. One acre foot is 325,851 gallons.
122. See Clark Fork Settlement Agreement ¶

A, available at http://www.avistautilities.com/resources/hydro/clarkfork/assets/021999_Clark_Fork_Settlement_Agreement.pdf
(last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
123. Id.
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on the Committee. Just as importantly, like
the PG&E Stipulation, it outlined the responsibilities of the Committee,125 allowing the
Committee to focus on the task at hand instead of trying to outline its role. As did the
PG&E Stipulation, the Clark Fork Agreement
established an open meeting requirement,
reporting responsibilities, and a consensusbased decision-making structure.126 And
similar to the PG&E Stipulation, the Clark
Fork Agreement also guaranteed the survival
of the balances struck by including a stipulation that even if FERC omitted from the license any of the conditions that the parties
had agreed upon, Avista would continue to
be bound by the agreement’s terms, enforceable in a court of competent jurisdiction.127
In the event of a failure to reach consensus, the Management Committee decision-making structure put in place by the
Clark Fork Agreement offers a few differences
from PG&E’s. The consensus requirement
could lead to gridlock with twenty-seven
committee members. Also, dispute resolution potentially could be lengthy and resource-intensive. Apparently, in an effort to
avoid both scenarios, the Clark Fork Agreement instituted an intermediate procedure
more streamlined than consensus, yet still
requiring substantial agreement among the
parties. This alternate voting procedure requires a unanimous vote by the utility, Montana and Idaho (one vote each, regardless
of the number of state agencies represented
on the Management Committee), the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Forest Service, as well as a majority vote of the
other Committee members present. 128
124. Id. ¶ 26.
125. Id.
126. Id. ¶ 28.
127.Id. ¶ 5.
128.Id. ¶ 28.
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Should this voting procedure also fail to
produce a decision, the decision-making
process finally resorts to dispute resolution
overseen by FERC.129 While this alternate
voting procedure may undermine the consensus requirement to some extent, it still
places significant emphasis on collective
decisionmaking.
In another notable variation from the
PG&E Conservation Commitment, the Clark
Fork Agreement gave the Management Committee, and not the utility, final approval on
the actions to be taken,130 thus avoiding
even the slimmest possibility that one party
could disproportionately influence decisions. While the PG&E Stipulation added
terms to assuage some of the concerns
raised by the Conservation Commitment in
providing for the Corporation only to make
recommendations to PG&E, it did not entirely dispense with the possibility.131
Another significant difference follows
directly from the FERC licensing context in
which this settlement was negotiated. Since
the Avista license was to be issued for a 45year term, the parties agreed to adaptive
management practices, allowing for the
modification of the protection, mitigation,
and enhancement measures (“PMEs”) included in the license (subject to FERC approval) in response to new information,
technologies, and changing environmental
and social needs.132 This “living license,” as

129. Id. ¶ 29.
130. Id. ¶ 26.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 86 and 101-03.
132. 90 FERC ¶ 61,167, at 61,511; see Clark Fork

Settlement Agreement, supra note 122, ¶¶ 7, 26.
133. See Richardson, supra note 7, at 530.
134. Clark Fork Settlement Agreement, supra
note 122, ¶ 21; 90 FERC ¶ 61,167, at 61,511.
135. See Appendices to the Clark Fork Settlement Agreement, available at http://
www.avistautilities.com/resources/hydro/
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termed by Avista, reflects a powerful change
from the traditional paradigm where licenses
once issued were virtually untouchable.133
Finally, one of the biggest differences
between the PG&E Conservation Commitment and the Clark Fork Agreement is in the
scope and detail of the projects contemplated. Whereas the PG&E Commitment is
aimed primarily at putting in place conservation easements and fee simple donations
to environmentally minded organizations,
the Clark Fork Agreement commits Avista to
active stewardship of its watershed lands
outlined in twenty-one separate PMEs with
specific objectives — ranging from mitigation of shoreline erosion to fisheries enhancements and protection of terrestrial, riparian, wildlife, aesthetic, and recreational
resources.134 These PMEs are detailed in
appendices and supporting material covering more than 166 pages;135 some of the
PMEs even have submeasures that are separately detailed.136 For example, just the
Idaho Trout Habitat Acquisition and Fishery Enhancement Program covers more than
six pages of programmatic content, detailing the purpose and goal of the program,
the concerns to be addressed, the studies
and analysis providing the basis for the
measure, the proposed measures themselves, and the funding set aside for the
measure.137 Mitigation measures cover a
wide variety of environmental approaches,
from acquiring habitat,138 to monitoring

clarkfork/assets/PME.pdf (last visited Sept. 14,
2004) [hereinafter CFSA Appendices].
136. See, e.g., Clark Fork Settlement Agreement, supra note 122, ¶ 21(f) (the Water Resources Program PM&E has five separate
submeasures detailed in the Appendices).
137. These details are discussed in Appendix
A of the CFSA Appendices, supra note 135.
138. Appendix B of the CFSA Appendices,
supra note 135, is aimed at habitat acquisition
and recreational fishery enhancement.

studies,139 to increasing minimum flows
from the dam.140 In return for its commitments, Avista received its new license two
years before its license would have expired
and for a term of forty-five years,141 just short
of the fifty-year maximum, providing continuity and certainty in its business operations. In reaching agreement on such a
large number of specific commitments, the
Clark Fork Agreement illustrates that not
only can collaborative arrangements offer
advantages and improvements over the traditional model (as shown by the PG&E example), but also that such arrangements can
cover a broad range of issues.
More importantly perhaps, the Clark
Fork Agreement demonstrates that such
agreements can be durable and successful:
not only does the flexibility of the living license arrangement help ensure that the
collaboration will continue through changing circumstances, the agreement has already made significant progress in protecting the environment. For instance, the Clark
Fork Project has restored more than a mile
of an important Bull trout spawning stream
back to its historical channel.142 The project
has also transported Bull trout over the hydropower dam in an effort to reestablish
historic migration routes for the first time in
more than fifty years.143 Among its other
successes, the project counts the purchase
for preservation of 871 acres of wetland and
riparian habitat.144 And of course, the commitment to increased minimum flows produces continuing environmental benefits.

139. Appendix F1 of the CFSA Appendices, supra
note 135, proposes a water quality monitoring program.
140. CFSA Appendices, supra note 135, at T-5.
141. Clark Fork Settlement Agreement, supra
note 122, ¶ 3.
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V. Conclusion
As more and more hydropower facilities
come up for re-licensing in the upcoming
years, the FERC re-licensing process offers a
unique opportunity to inject environmental
considerations into a resource-use that, although beneficial in many ways, has also
caused significant environmental harm in the
past. The collaborative approach embodied
in the Alternative Licensing Process and incorporated into the Integrated Licensing Process, is an increasingly favored route to relicensing and has the potential to produce
less expensive, less time- and resource-intensive, and more productive arrangements
to protect the environment while preserving
the hydropower facilities’ ability to carry out
their business. The PG&E and Avista agreements illustrate the potential advantages of
the collaborative approach:


the greater likelihood of addressing the
concerns of the various constituencies
since the confrontational ethos of the
formal process is avoided;



the input of all the interested parties
from the nascent stages of the licensing process, increasing the chances
of producing better structured and
more relevant environmental studies;



an attendant decrease in the amount
of time involved as, instead of fighting each other at cross-purposes,
parties try to find areas of agreement,
leading to faster responses to environmental problems;



the potential for long-term and future collaboration; and



more informed choices in general.

142. Avista Utilities, Clark Fork Project, at http:/
/www.avistautilities.com/resources/hydro/
clarkfork/default.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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The PG&E example also illustrates flaws
in the collaborative approach. The collaborative approach could potentially lead to the
exclusion of already marginalized voices.
Alternatively, it could lead to resource inefficiency if parties attempt to force concessions at the end of a long process after significant amounts of time and money have
been invested in negotiations. Continued
vigilance will be necessary to ensure an inclusive process and to protect against endruns of the collaborative process.
As the collaborative approach and
settlement agreements become more common, techniques to ensure effective, durable
agreements become increasingly important.
The PG&E and Avista agreements in their
final forms illustrate a few of the strategies
and tools that may prove useful in creating
such agreements.
For example, one of the tools that helps
make sure that the balances struck in agreements are not undermined is adopting
adaptive management practices, as in the
Clark Fork Agreement, which allow for
changes to the agreement in response to
changing situations and information. Also,
characterizing the agreement as a contract
is a useful approach which ensures that any
terms that cannot be enforced by FERC, or
are not included in the license, continue to
be enforceable obligations for the parties.145
Strategies for creating long-term protections for environmental values include focusing on the composition and decision-making process of the body implementing the
agreement, instead of defining terms to be
eco-protective. Focusing on the relatively
objective issues of fair processes in negotiations avoids the disagreements that are likely
to follow from trying to address the relatively
subjective topic of what particular terms such
145. RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 39, at Introduction § E; Hydroelectric Licensing Under the
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as “public interest” mean. And the compositional protections and the decision-making
processes ensure that environmental perspectives are properly considered in governing body decisionmaking even if terms become outdated. If all else fails, it is always
possible to revert to defining terms.
Both the agreements studied in this
article illustrate some of the compositional
and decisionmaking process elements that
are likely to result in protection of environmental values. Compositionally, it is important to provide for a meaningful environmental presence on the decision-making body and to combine it with a consensus-based decisionmaking process to minimize any imbalance in the numbers. This
ensures that environmental perspectives
cannot be ignored.
From a decision-making process perspective, both agreements appear to have
found it important to delineate the responsibilities of the governing body so that its
decision-making is focused on the objective
task at hand and not on the more openended task of defining the scope of its work.
Also, as both agreements suggest, a disputeresolution process can address the potential intransigence in the consensus model.
Interposing an intermediate step to avoid
expensive arbitration to the extent possible,
as in the Clark Fork Agreement, is also an
option — albeit one that may undermine
the consensus-process to some degree.
Some other considerations addressed
by the PG&E and Avista agreements may
also be worth keeping in mind. Anticipating nonenvironmental issues that may impact the process and including potential
opponents on those issues in settlement
discussions is likely to preempt problems.
The participants in the PG&E process
Federal Power Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 51,104, ¶ 342
(citing the Clark Fork Agreement at n.323).

headed off a potential impediment by including the Regional Council of Rural Counties in discussions and addressing concerns
about property tax losses.
It also may be important to impose
deadlines and timeframes to keep the process moving along, and to impose reporting requirements to ensure transparency,
adherence to the established guidelines,
and an opportunity to correct problems.
FERC’s Integrated Licensing Process (which
becomes the default in July 2005) imposes
timelines and reporting requirements. However, it may also be necessary to include
such terms in the settlement agreement itself if the Alternate Licensing Process is
used,146 or if the timelines and reporting
requirements concern issues not within
FERC’s jurisdiction and therefore are not
included in the license.
Finally, it may be necessary to clarify
the governing body’s role and to limit the
utility’s influence, as the PG&E example
suggests. Whether the Board or Management Committee makes recommendations
to the licensee or directly implements its
responsibilities may be an important distinction in agreements which involve issues that
are not subject to FERC oversight, and where
final decisions on the issues could end up
resting in the hands of the applicant alone.
Keeping these considerations in mind
and using some of the tools discussed
above, collaborative re-licensing agreements
under the Integrated and Alternative Licensing Processes offer the possibility of durable
and effective solutions to the environmental problems faced by so many watershed
lands while still allowing society to reap the
146. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
147. Blaine Harden, Proposal Restricts Appeals

on Dams; Administration Plan Could Help Hydropower
Firms Avoid Costs, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2004, at A1
(emphasis added).
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benefits of hydropower. As numerous hydropower facilities come up for re-licensing
in the next few years, such agreements
present a unique opportunity to better protect, rehabilitate, and enjoy our rivers and
riparian ecology.
Update
Recent events may have serious implications for the collaborative approach to relicensing. The Bush administration recently
“proposed [a rule] giving dam owners the
exclusive right to appeal Interior Department
rulings about how dams should be licensed
and operated on American rivers” to senior
political appointees in the Interior Department.147 Currently, the re-licensing process
requires hydropower applicants to consult
with various units of the Interior Department, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, regarding conditions that should be
imposed on licenses to protect environmental and recreational values.148 The Fish and
Wildlife Service’s recommendations on appropriate conditions are owed deference by
FERC pursuant to section 10(j) of the FPA.149
In addition, Interior is often responsible for
imposing mandatory conditions on re-licensed projects pursuant to section 4(e) of
the FPA.150 Interior’s recommendations and
mandatory conditions are subject to public
comment, and final decisions as to the content of the conditions are made by mid-level
Interior Department officials.151 If the hydropower companies are allowed an exclusive appeal, other stakeholders are excluded
from the process, and environmental and
recreational considerations that would otherwise have been recommended or mandated on the basis of science may be left
148.18 C.F.R. § 16.8(a)(1).
149. See supra note 42.
150. Id.
151. Editorial, Damming Dissent, S.F. CHRON.,
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out.152 The resource agencies normally participate in the collaborative process negotiations, and the threat of restrictive conditions that they may eventually impose is part
of the calculus driving the negotiations in
the collaborative process. 153 The more business-friendly conditions likely to result from
the process of exclusive appeals154 will probably reduce the pressure on hydropower
companies to make concessions. Additionally, conditions once imposed because of
Interior Department recommendations or
mandatory conditions would then have to
be negotiated via the collaborative process.
This would likely reduce the scope of the

agreements since environmentalists would
probably have to compromise on or leave
out other issues in order to get these concessions. Finally, for any agreements that
continue to be negotiated, the policy greatly
increases the importance of characterizing
the agreements as contracts enforceable in
court outside the re-licensing process, since
some of these conditions may no longer be
“mandatory” conditions. The legality of the
rule is far from certain155 however, and there
is still a good chance that the collaborative
process will escape unscathed to help protect environmental values in the hydropower
re-licensing process.

Nov. 18, 2004, at B8 (“The conditions for a new
dam license are set by mid-level Interior Department officials, who hold hearings, sift through
the testimony and ship the final agreement to
Washington. The new proposal dumps this
ground-up approach in favor of a straight pitch
at the deputy-secretary level, which is populated
with Bush appointees.”).
152. See id. (“Additional fish ladders to preserve
salmon runs? Steady water flows to preserve other
wildlife or public use? Recreation access and water standards? Private dam operators want a
chance to debate their obligations on such points
in direct talks with a business-friendly administration. The public could be left out.”); Press Release, California Hydropower Reform Coalition,
Proposed Hydro Rules Enshrines Energy Industry
Access (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://
www.calhrc.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (“‘This
policy will ensure that decisions are made on the
basis of politics rather than science,’ said Steve
Moyer, Vice President of Government Affairs and
Volunteer Operations for Trout Unlimited.”).
153. See, e.g., Clark Fork Settlement Agreement,
supra note 122, ¶¶ 17-19, esp. ¶ 18 (“[The United
States Forest Service (“USFS”), a part of the Interior Department] does represent that, given the
measures that Avista is required to implement
under this Agreement, including Avista’s commit-

ment to spend operation and maintenance dollars as estimated by USFS for their recreation facilities within the project, . . . it is presently unaware of any reason which would require it to submit any mandatory conditions for the Clark Fork
Projects pursuant to Section 4(e) of the [Federal
Power Act] which would be materially inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement. Should
USFS, for whatever reason, submit mandatory Section 4(e) conditions to FERC which are materially
inconsistent with this Agreement, any Party may
withdraw from this Agreement.”).
154. See supra note 151.
155. See Harden, supra note 147. The article
states as follows:

48

Inside the Interior Department, some lawyers have
argued that the appeals proposal — three years in the
making before being published last month in the Federal Register — is unconstitutional because it violates
due process and equal protection guarantees.
“It is not legal because one party is being treated very
differently than another, and that is very much the
opposite of what we have been trying to do for years,”
said one senior Interior Department official who is
involved in the dispute and who requested anonymity for fear of retaliation. “Suddenly, a licensee can walk
away from everybody else and have a private meeting
with the assistant secretary and bring in new conditions that haven’t been reviewed by anybody before.”

